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STATEMENT OP THE NATORE OF THE CASE 
Biis appeal is taken fran a final judgment Rendered by the Second 
Ju3icial District Court concerning a quiet title actiori, (A-1) 
We contend that defendants-appellants have ^  14 th Amendment 
fundamental right to reasonable notice prior to the unilateral destruction of 
their security interest. 
OODRSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On or about the 16th day of March, 1984, plaintiffs-respondents 
(hereinafter Dirks) filed the present quiet title action based \pon U.C.A. 
78-40-1. The action was filed in Weber County in ordet to ccmply with the 
venue provisions of U.C.A. 78-13-1. 
On or about the 25th day of May, 1984, Dirk? filed a motion for 
suninary judgment. Defendants-appellants (hereinafter goodwills) opposed the 
motion and filed a cross-mot ion for suninary judgment. The Trial Court granted 
Dirks* motion for summary judgment, thereby denying Goodwill1 s cross-motion. 
(A-2) 
The October 5, 1984, final decree quieting Ititle in plaintiffs 
embodies Dirks1 suitnary judgirent. (A-1) It is this orfter which the Goodwills 
appeal today. 
RELIEF SOCKET OK APPEAL 
On appeal, the Goodwills seek reversal of the trial court's 
decision, and an order vacating the prior foreclosure sale. 
Simply stated, the defendants seek an opportunity to purchase the 
Dirks1 equity, thereby preserving the Goodwills1 security interest. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The present quiet title action arose out of a foreclosure 
proceeding which served to cut off the security interest of Mr. and Mrs. 
Goodwill without reasonable notice. On or about the 10th of June, 1977, Wanda 
Butler, original grantor to the property in question, purchased a piece of 
real property in Roy, Utah. On May 15, 1978, the Butlers sold the real 
property to defendants Paul S. Cornwell and Catherine L. Cornwell under a 
Ufciform Real Estate Contract. 
On or about March 3, 1980, the Cornwells borrowed the sum of 
$38,000 from Mr. and Mrs. Goodwill, defendants in this action. The Cornwells 
executed a trust deed on this property in favor of the Goodwills as 
beneficiaries, in order to create a security interest. The security interest 
wis recorded on April 3, 1980. 
The Cornwells failed to make their payments as required by the 
Contract executed in favor of the Butlers. The Butlers notified the Cornwells 
that the Cornwells were in default on their Uniform Real Estate Contract. On 
March 4, 1981, the Butlers sent a Notice of Default and Cancellation of 
Contract to the Cornwells. This notice was recorded on March 12, 1981, and the 
property was subsequently sold to the Dirks. No notice was given to Mr. and 
Mrs. Goodwill of the foreclosure proceeding. 
Despite the ease of searching a grantor-grantee index system, as 
used in the Weber County Recorderfs Office, the Butlers failed to notify the 
Goodwills that their security interest in the amount of $38,000 was about to 
be cut off. 
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Approximately three years later, after th^ property was sold, the 
Goodwillls were apprised of the foreclosure proceedings • We submit that while 
these facts remain undisputed, the Goodwills had and continue to have a 
fundamental right to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard, prior 
to the unilateral destruction of their security interest. 
SOfftRY OF ARGOMENTS 
We submit that first, the Goodwills were entitled to notice and 
hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Anything less 
violates the fundamental fairness doctrine of the 14th fcnendment. 
Second, w^ submit that the state action requirement of the 14th 
Amendment has been satisfied by virtue of the analytical tools provided by the 
Federal Courts of this land. More specifically, the use of the courts to 
enforce a private agreement constitutes state action k Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 
U.S. 1 (1948). 
Moreover, the incidental mutual benefits fcnjoyed by the state, 
including continuity in enforcement of real estate laws, constitute 
significant state involvement and state action. Burfon v. Wilmington Park 
Authority, 365 U.S. 714 (1961). Finally, the Goodwills1 deprivation was caused 
by a rule of conduct imposed by the State, and was ifltplemented by a person who 
jxay fairly be .said tt> be a state actor, the judiciary. See Lucrar v. ESmondson 
Oil Ccmpany, 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2(3 482 (1982). 
AHSDMHHT I. 
TftE TRIAL O00RT BRRH) AS A MKPEBRI OF UW 
IN GRANTING DIRKS1 WHOM FOR SONAR? JUDGMENT 
AM) IN DHJTING GOODWILLS1 GROSS-MOTION FOR ISOMARY JQDGHHIT 
4 
A. The Foreclosure and Quiet Title Procedure 
Constitutes State Action Within the Meaning of Due Process. 
Ihe 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, "No 
state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law...." (A-4) This amendment guarantees procedural fairness, 
inhibiting only such action as may be said to be that of the State. The Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). 
The question of whether particular conduct is "private" or whether 
it constitutes "state action" cuts broadly across the spectrum of 
constitutional questions. However, the Courts have provided seme guidance. 
While this guidance may be seen as alternative "tests," the First Circuit 
views them as alternative analytical tools to be used in assessing the unique 
facts and circumstances of each case. Gerina v. Puerto Rico Legal Services, 
Inc., 697 F.2d 447 (1st Circuit 1983). We respectfully submit that viewing the 
Goodwill case through the lenses of the various "tests," one cannot but 
conclude that the Dirks, acting in concert with the government, should be held 
responsible for the action causing the deprivation. 
In the present case, the Dirks argue that state action should not 
be attributed to foreclosure under a private contract, This issue has been 
faced squarely by the United States Supreme Court. In Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 
U.S. 1 (1948), the Court was asked to judicially enforce discriminatory 
covenants of a private real estate contract. The Supreme Court recognized that 
"(b)ut for the act of intervention of the State Courts, supported by the full 
panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the 
properties in question without restraint." Id. at 19. 
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The Court held, inter alia,, that the judicial enforcement of a 
private contract constitutes state action, "and when the effect of that action 
is to deny rights subject to the protection of the 14th Amendment, it is the 
obligation of (the) Court to enforce the constitutional commands." Id. at 20., 
accord Galella v. Onassis, 353 F.Si^p. 196 (S.D.N.Y. JL972). 
Similarly, the present foreclosure was foujnded upon a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, a private agreement. While it may h&ve been enforced 
nonjudicially, the final step of quieting title, pursuant to U.C.A. 78-40-1, 
required judicial intervention. Without invoking th0 "panoply of state power" 
and significantly involving the State, the present pifivate foreclosure oould 
not be perfected. 
Moreover, in providing facilities, services and extensive 
regulation which assist in the foreclosure of a private agreement, state 
action is present. In Burton v. Wilmington Park Autfoprity, 365 U.S. 714 
(1961), the Supreme Court found that when the State ^significantly" involved 
itself with the private party, state action was present. 
In Wilmington Park Authority, the plaintiff sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief against a privately owned restaurant located within a 
building owned and operated by an agency of the Statp of Delaware. The 
restaurant was the agency's lessee. Both parties enlicyed a variety of 
"incidental utual benefits." 
The majority found that: 
"The State (had) so far insinuated itself into a position 
of interdependence with (the restaurant) that it must be recognized 
as a joint participant in the challenge activity, which, on that 
account, cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private1 as 
to fall without the scope of the 14th Amendment." Id. at 725. 
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In the present case, the State of Utah enjoys a variety of 
incidental mutual benefits. First and foremost among these benefits is 
continuity in enforcement. This continuity is accomplished by statutes 
establishing rcaal property venue (U.C.A. 78-13-1), lis pendens notice (U.C.A. 
78-40-2), statutory cause of action quieting title (U.C.A. 78-40-1), 
regulation of legal description in conveyance (U.C.A. 57-3-10), effective 
failure to record (U.C.A. 57-3-3), record imparting notice (U.C.A. 57-3-2), 
acknowledgements and recording conveyances (57-3-1, et seq.), together with 
regulation of the content of the instrument (U.C.A. 57-1-13). Simply stated, 
extensiveness of regulation provides continuity of enforcement within our 
society. The State is incidentally and substantially benefitted thereby. 
Concomitantly, Dirks enjoy a state-sanctioned mechanism by which to quiet 
title. 
While the private individual must initiate the process, the 
government agency must specifically approve the final step before Dirks has 
good title. Under the authority of Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), 
this is akin to state encouragement. Although the State neither commanded nor 
expressly authorized or encouraged the due process violations, the foreclosure 
may not be perfected without the help of the State. The State has elected to 
place its "pcwer, property and prestige" behind the illegal conduct. Id. at 
380. Statutory authorization of the quiet title remedy, together with 
extensive governmental property regulation, makes the State a partner in the 
activity. 
In Northrup v. F.N.M.A., 372 P.Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974), the 
Court found state action by virtue of a statute providing for foreclosure by 
advertisement. Ihe Court stated, "In view of plaintiff's allegation and the 
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fact that the statute itself makes foreclosure by advertisement possible, the 
Court is of the opinion that the statute does signif i|cantly encourage 
foreclosure by advertisement* Accordingly, the Courn concludes that state 
action exists." H ^ at 597. 
A final analytical tool is found in Lugar v. Bdmondson Oil Company, 
457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Bd.2d 482 (1982). Lugar found state action 
in a setting in which officials participated directly in the deprivation, but 
it did so using a new test which appears to be an attempt at a unifying 
synthesis of past decisions. 
Lugar involved the ex parte prejudgment attachment of a debtor's 
personal property. The debtor challenged the procedure, based upon the due 
process clause of the 14th Amendment and upon 42 U.S|.C. 1983. 
In analyzing the state action requirement of both provisions, the 
Court first reaffirmed United States v. Price, 383 d.S. 787, 794, n. 7, 86 
S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed. 2d 267 (1966), in stating that the oolor of law 
requirement and the State action requirement "were identical." Lugar, supra. 
at 928, 102 S.Ct. at , 73 L.Ed.2d at 489. The Q>urt went on to analyze the 
related body of cases beginning with Sniadach v. Eanfily Finance Corp., 395 
U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969), together with the most recent 
state action pronouncements. 
Justice 'White, speaking for the majority, established a two-part 
state action test: 
* First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of 
some right or privilege created by the Sttate or by a rule of 
conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is 
responsible.11 Supra at 937, 73 L.Ed.2d 4^5. 
Based upon the procedural scheme created by the statute, the Court 
found that this "obviously" was state action. ML £t 941, 73 L.Ed.2d 498. 
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"Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a 
person who nay fairly be said to be a state actor." Id. at 937, 73 
L.Bd.2d 495. 
The Court found that the second prong had also been satisfied, 
stating, "this is sufficient when the State has created a system whereby state 
officials will attach property on the ex parte application of one party to a 
private dispute." Id^ at 942, 73 L.Ed.2d at 498. 
In the present case, the deprivation was clearly caused by a rule 
of conduct imposed by the State. As in Luqar, this rule of conduct is the 
procedural mechanism by which Dirks have invoked to remove the cloud an their 
title. Moreover, the extensive statutory regulation clearly constitutes rules 
of conduct imposed by the State. 
And, similar to Luqar, the second prong has also been satisfied. 
The State has created a system, or a mechanism, whereby state officials will 
condone, support and perfect the deprivation of prqperty in a private dispute, 
by virtue of a State-created system. This is illustrated by the body of law 
regulating real prqperty and title thereto. 
We submit that using the foregoing analytical tools, and viewing 
various aspects of the case through the lenses of the various "tests," it is 
evident that the facts in the instant case constitute state action, thereby 
placing the Goodwills within the purview of fundamental fairness. 
B. The Goodwills Have a 14th Amendment Fundamental Right 
to Reasonable Notice Prior to the Unilateral Destruction 
of Their Security Interest 
A security interest in real or personal property has been expressly 
recognized as a significant prqperty interest under Utah law. Accordingly, ws 
submit that the Goodwills are entitled to fundamental fairness before their 
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security interest can be extinguished. The minimum procedures demanded by due 
process are notice and hearing. 
Fundamental fairness is determined by balancing the interests 
fa\*oring summary determination against the harm to the person aggrieved. The 
United States Supreme Court favors three balancing factors: (1) The severity 
of the harm to the litigant if the requested procedures are not granted; (2) 
the risk of error if the procedures are not afforded; and (3) the 
administrative difficulty and cost of providing reasonable procedures. See 
Goldberg v. Kellyf 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
In the instant case, the severity of the harm is manifest. Despite 
the fact that the Goodwills duly recorded their security interest with the 
Weber County Recorders Office, they have new been informed that this act of 
recording had no force or effect. We submit that the simple act of mailing 
notice to the Goodwills was all that would have been necessary to satisfy 
fundamental fairness. Were such notice afforded Mr. and Mrs. Goodwill, they 
oould have made an educated decision either to voluntarily forego their 
security interest, or instead, to undertake the defajulting parties' 
contractual performance. 
On the issue of notice, the United States Supreme Court has 
observed: 
"As was onphasized in Mullane, tihe requirement that 
parties be notified of proceedings affecting their legally 
protected interests is obviously a vital corollary to one of the 
most fundamental prerequisites of due process - the right to be 
heard. This right ... has little reality of vaorth unless one is 
informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself 
whether to appear or default, acquiese ox[ contest." Schrodervy v. 
City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 83 S.Ct. 279 (1962). 
In the present aase, the Dirks argue thatp if Mr. and Mrs. Goodwill 
wished to protect their loan after the Cornwells ha<J defaulted on the Real 
10 
Estate Contract, it was essential that the Goodwills make a tender of a full 
and unqualified contractual performance of the defaulting party* 
Unfortunately, as indicated, the Goodwills were not afforded an opportunity to 
take over the contract. The Goodwills were not even apprised of the 
proceedings until some three (3) years after the foreclosure was final. At 
this moment, Mr. and Mrs. Goodwill stand ready, willing and able to tender 
full performance to the Butlers, resulting from the Cornwell default on the 
contract. Simply stated, it was impossible for the Goodwills to comply with a 
contractual default of which they had no knowledge until now. Accordingly, the 
Goodwills are now being punished for the default of another. 
As to the second criteria set forth in Goldberg v. Kelly, the risk 
of error if reasonable procedures are not afforded is manifest. Tlie loss of a 
$38,000 security interest could have been easily remedied by a 5-minute 
perusal of one page of the grantor-grantee index used by the Weber County 
Recorders Office. Under such a recording system, the identities and addresses 
of all parties with an interest in the realty can be ascertained within 
minutes. In addition, any title search precedent to the foreclosure sale would 
clearly reveal the names and addresses of all subsequently recorded interests 
of record. 
It is apparent that if the names and addresses of such parties are 
so readily available to the Butlers1 trustee, these parties could have been 
advised of the pandency of the proceeding, and could have been afforded an 
opportunity to protect their interests. The ministerial procedures for 
complying with fundamental fairness are insignificant in relation to the 
severity of harm to the aggrieved party. 
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The Dirks further argue that the Notice of Foreclosure was 
published, and that, accordingly, the Goodwills were constructively served 
with notice. We submit that even notice by publication is constitutionally 
insufficient. On this issue the United States Supreme Court has observed, 
•Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local 
inserted in the back 
home outside the area of 
resident, an advertisement in small print 
pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his 
the newspaperfs normal circulation, the odds that the information 
will never reach him are large indeed. The chance of actual Notice 
is further reduced when, as is here, the notice requirement does 
not even name those *dx>se attention it is supposed to attract, and 
does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention." 
Mullane v. Hanover Trust, 339 U.S. at 315|, 70 S.Ct. at 658. 
The general rule that emerges frcro the Hjllane case is that notice 
by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose name and address 
are known or are very easily ascertainable, and whoSe legally protected 
interests are directly affected by the proceedings }n question. 339 U.S. at 
318, 70 S.Ct. at 659. 
As indicated, the names and addresses of those parties that had a 
record interest in the realty, including the Goodwills, were and renain 
readily ascertainable. As such, they were entitled at a minimum to personal 
notice by mail. We submit that the notice by publication provided in the 
instant case is constitutionally infirm. The notice by publication does not 
comport with the fundamental fairness required before a person may be deprived 
of substantial property rights. 
A similar problem arose in the case of florthrip v. F.N.M.A., 372 
F.Si?>p. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974). Brenda Northrip, the plaintiff, borrowed the 
sum of $11,000 from Aver Company. Hie loan was secured by a mortgage on her 
home. The mortgage company subsequently assigned its interest to the Federal 
National Mortgage Association, which subsequently foreclosed the mortgage. The 
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foreclosure was carried out without actual notice to Northrip. She instead 
received constructive notice by publication. 
The Federal Court held that notice by publication failed to provide 
an adequate opportunity to be heard before the taking of a significant 
property interest for two reasons. First, the procedure did not include 
arrangements for a hearing before the sale of the property, thereby placing 
upon plaintiff the burden of bringing suit to stop the sale, and second, there 
was no evidence in the record to suggest the plaintiff was ever given notice 
of the method to be used to obtain a hearing. Id. at 599-600. 
A most recent case invalidating a surrmary foreclosure sale is 
Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F.Sipp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975). Turner involved a due 
process challenge to a state statutory trust deed foreclosure statute. The 
majority held that while the nortgagor received no personal notice of the 
foreclosure sale, she was deprived of due process, and that the sale was 
prospectively unlawful and void. "When notice is a person1s due, process which 
is a mere gesture is not due process." Id. at 1258, citing Mullanef supra, 339 
U.S. at 315, 70 S.Ct. at 657. 
The overriding purpose of 14th Amendment protections
 f in the words 
of Justice Stewart, "is to protect (a person's) use and possession of property 
from arbitrary encroachment - to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken 
deprivations of property..." 47 U.S. at 81. It is clear that the unilateral 
destruction of the Goodwills1 security interest, without notice, is 
substantively unfair. Accord, Garner v. Tri-State Development Cccpany, 382 
F.Supp. 377 (E.D.Mich. 1974). 
In the instant case the Dirks have argued that, due process aside, 
Utah case law supports the present foreclosure procedure, citing Wiscombe v. 
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Lockhart, 608 P.2d 236 (Utah 1980). Wisccmbe involved a buyer who was 
foreclosed upon by its seller. Approximately three yeeks after the 
foreclosuref the mortgagor assigned his interest to the Lockhart Canpany. The 
Court held that the foreclosure served to cut off the interest of the Lockhart 
Company, hasing its decision specifically upon the l£w of assignment. The 
Court stated that "fundamental to the law of assignntent is the concept that an 
assignee takes nothing more by his assignment than his assignor had." Id. at 
238. 
Hie present case is factually distinguishable frcm Wiscanbe. More 
specifically, the Goodwills obtained their security interest before the 
foreclosure took place, whereas in Wiscanbe, the secjrurity interest was 
obtained some three weeks after the assignor no longer had an interest to 
assign. The Dirks1 reliance on Wisccmbe is misplaced. 
The foreclosure sale and power of sale ih real estate contracts, 
mortgages and deeds of trust, have been critically questioned in light of the 
due process clause. See Law v. U.S. Department of ftqriculture, 366 F.Supp. 
1233 (1973). In a recent decision, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the 
debtor and subordinated creditor were entitled to a| due process hearing. Based 
upon the lack of a hearing afforded by the trust de£d nonjudicial sale, the 
Court vacated the trust deed sale. See Valley Development v. Wardner, 557 P.2d 
1180 (1976). In a related case, the U.S. District Court, Division of Maine, 
vacated the foreclosure and sale of a piece of reality. The decision was based 
upon the due process clause of the 5th Amendment. ?ee Ricker v. Onited States, 
417 F.Sipp. 133 (1976). Finally, a Kansas State Appellate Court recently 
vacated a foreclosure sale on due process grounds. F.N.M.A. v. Beard, 659 P.2d 
232 (1983). The Kansas Court held that where the i^ ames and addresses of 
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adverse parties; are known and easily ascertainablef notice of the foreclosure 
by publication alone is a violation of due process. The Court went on to 
vacate the foreclosure sale. 
Public policy also supports the Goodwills1 position. Giving due 
notice and an opportunity to be heard requires no more than good faith in 
notifying the debtor or creditor of the mortgagee's intention to foreclose. 
Moreover, notice and hearing alio* the borrower or the borrower's creditor to 
defend against an unfair or mistaken claim of default, or to raise collateral 
defenses such as fraudulent misrepresentation of the nature of an instrument 
at the time of signing. 
Finally, Justice White, dissenting in Fuentes, reasoned that after 
default a secured creditor's interest in minimizing his loss - the interest in 
preventing further usage and deterioration of the property - is as deserving 
of protection as; the debtor's interest in the secured property. The Goodwills' 
security interest is entitled to this type of protection as a basic tenet of 
fundamental fairness. 
oowaflsioN 
We respectfully submit that the Goodwills are entitled to notice 
and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner. We do not seek to deprive Dirks of their newly purchased realty. We 
seek only to vacate the foreclosure sale, and to give the Goodwills an 
opportunity to purchase Dirks' interest in the property, or to take vrtiatever 
steps are necessary to preserve the Goodwills' security interest. 
15 
Foreclosure is an equitable proceeding. And although the maxim "He 
who seeks equity must do equity" is well recognised in the courts today, this 
maxim was not followed in the Goodwill case. 
Based upon equitable doctrines and upcin the doctrine of fundamental 
fairness, the trial court decision should be reversed, the foreclosure sale 
should be vacated, and the Goodwills should be provided a meaningful 
opportunity to preserve their hard-earned security interest. 
ay of January, 1985. 
SPAFEDRD, 0IBB, DUFFIN & JENSEN 
r 
Earl 0. Sp^fford 7 7 / 
Lynn(^C. Lynn <;. Spafford 
Attorneys 
Wilfordl 
Dorothy 
tor Defendants/Appellants 
W. Goodwill and 
P. Goodwill 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs Dirks 
543 Twenty-Fifth Street 
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Telephone: (801) 621-6540 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
A (\' <. 
DARWIN DIRKS and 
JACQUELYN DIRKS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PAUL S. CORNWELL, 
CATHERINE L. CORNWELL, 
WILFORD W. GOODWILL, 
DOROTHY P. GOODWILL, 
CLEARFIELD STATE BANK, 
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, 
WESTERN BONDED COLLECTIONS, 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF 
OGDEN, 
and 
OGDEN FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
and 
All other persons unknown 
claiming any right, title, 
estate, lien, or interest in the 
real property described in 
Plaintiff's complaint adverse 
to Plaintiff's ownership or 
any cloud upon Plaintiff's title 
thereto, 
Defendants. 
# 
ORDER FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENTS 
AND FOR FINAL DECREE 
QUIETING TITLE IN PLAINTIFFS 
Civil No. CV-088270 
In this action, it appearing to the satisfaction of 
this Court that the Defendants Paul S. Cornwell, Catherine L. Corn-
well, Wilford W. Goodwill, Dorothy P. Goodwill, Clearfield State 
A-l 
Bank, Small Business Administration, Westeri) Bonded Collections, 
Stewart Title Company of Ogden and Ogden tfirst Federal Savings 
and Loan Association were duly and personally served with the 
Summons and Amended Complaint herein, and, 
It also appearing to the satisfaction of this Court 
that the unknown Defendants were duly and regularly served by 
publication, pursuant to order of this Cburt previously made, 
and, 
It further appearing that no appelarance has been made 
and no answer filed by the Defendants Paul SI. Cornwell, Catherine 
L. Cornwell, Clearfield State Bank, Westerjn Bonded Collections, 
and Stewart Title Company of Ogden, and, a default of said Defendants 
Paul S. Cornwell, Catherine L, Cornwell, (Uearfield State Bank, 
Western Bonded Collections and Stewart Tittle Company of Ogden, 
having been duly entered, and, 
It also appearing that no appearances have been made 
and no answers filed by the unknown Defendants, and their default 
has also been duly entered, and 
It also appearing that Defendant $mall Business Admin-
istration has entered a Disclaimer of Interest to the real property 
that is the subjet of this action, and, 
It further appearing that Defendants Wilford W. Goodwill 
and Dorothy P. Goodwill have had their interest in the real 
property that is the subject of this actiion terminated by the 
granting of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, which termi-
nation has been appealed, and 
Evidence having been introduced and heard in open 
court# and the Court being satisfied that the allegations of 
the Amended Complaint are true and that the relief asked for 
should be granted, 
Now, upon the motion of Frank S. Warner and Douglas 
J. Holmes, attorneys for the Plaintiffs, Darwin Dirks and Jacquelyn 
Dirks, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That Defendants Paul S. Cornwell, Catherine L. Corn-
well, Clearfield State Bank, Western Bonded Collections and 
Stewart Title Company of Ogden are in default for failing to 
file their answers herein within the time required by law; and, 
2. That all unknown Defendants are in default for 
failing to file answers or make appearances in any form in the 
above entitled action within the time required by law; and, 
3. That defendant Small Business Administration has 
disclaimed any interest in the real property that is the subject 
of this action; and 
4. That Plaintiffs, Darwin Dirks and Jacquelyn Dirks, 
have judgment as prayed for in their Amended Complaint, against 
the Defendants, Paul S. Cornwell, Catherine L, Cornwell, Clearfield 
State Bank, Small Business Administration, Western Bonded Collec-
tions, Stewart Title Company of Ogden, and all other persons 
unknown claiming any right, title, estate, lien or interest 
in the real property described herein, and each and all of them; 
and, 
5. That all adverse claims of the ibove-named defendants, 
and each of them, and all persons claiming or to claim said 
real property or any part thereof, through ofc under said above-named 
defendants or any of them, are hereby adjudged and decreed to 
be invalid and groundless; and 
6. That Plaintiffs be and they are hereby declared 
and adjudged to be the true and lawful ownerls of the real property 
described in the Amended Complaint, and hereinafter described, 
subject to the trust deed held by Defendarit Ogden First Federal 
Savings and Loan Association, and subject tc) the appeal of Defendants 
Wilford W. Goodwill and Dorothy P. Woodvfill, and every part 
and parcel thereof and, 
7. That the Plaintiffs1 title %o the real property 
described in the Amended Complaint and hereinafter described, 
is adjudged to be quieted against all claimi, demands or pretensions 
of the Defendants or any of them who £re hereby perpetually 
estopped from setting up any claims theretO|, or any part thereof, 
except for Ogden First Federal Savings and Loan Association 
and except for the appeal of Defendant^ Wilford W. Goodwill 
and Dorothy P* Goodwill• 
Said real property is bounded andl described as follows: 
Lot 21, Block 3, Herefordshire Subdivision, No, 2, 
••planned Residential Development," Roy City, Weber 
County, Utah* 
8. That the interest of Defendant Ogden First Federal 
Savings and Loan Association in the abc^ ve described property 
is a legitimate interest which is not contested by the Plaintiffs 
and that interest is hereby confirmed, 
DATED this .5 day of October, 1984* 
T* c 
te&2> 
DISTRICT JUD 
4:drkorder 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Order for Default Judgments and for Final Decree Quieting Title 
in Plaintiffs, postage prepaid, this 22nd day 0f October, 1984, 
to the following: 
Earl S. Spafford 
Attorney for Defendants Wilford W. 
Goodwill and Dorothy P. Goodwill 
311 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 ill 
Kathleen B. Barrett 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Attorney for Defendant Sm^ll Business 
Administration 
P. 0. Box 2750 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Richard L. Stine 
Attorney for Defendant Ogcien First 
Federal Savings & Loan/Association 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84401 j 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
DARWIN DIRKS, et ux., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL S. CORNELL, et al., 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 88270 
Plaintiffs* motion for summary judgment is granted. 
DATED this 2nd day of August, 1984. 
/s/ Ronald O. Hyde 
RONALD 0. HYDE, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment to Frank 
S. Warner, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 543 - 25th Street, Ogden, 
Utah 84401, and to Earl S. Spafford, Attorney for Defendants 
Goodwill, 311 South State Street, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, on this 2nd day of August, 1984. 
/R/ Paula Carr 
PAULA CARR, Secretary 
A-2 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
SECTION I# AMENDMENT XIV 
"All persons born or naturalized in the lUnited States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside* No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within it$ jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." 
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w—*.w»i*t it r*>r urTDF.n STOOP SKr I^ R COMITTENT ADVICE." 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
I THIS AGREFMENT. mad» m Indicate thte 1 5 t h day of - . „ . Maj , A D , I L ? L , 
•y an* between . Al«a_S. Butler and Vanda F. llutler, hueband and .tfilt 
fctreinafter dtngna*ed at tb** Viler and Paul S. Cornvtil and Cathaxiae I . Coxnaall^JriatezidLJk wife 
K Joint tenante with fo i l right of trurriTorship and not aa^ej,aptf_iji__£C3n»?ni 
atrrlnafter deugnatrd aa the Ruyr °f - — — — — — _ - — . 
t WITNESSETH T» at «*»» VWr f.»? th» rtn««l»t»« .1 m»few r«»r»» rid »?>».-• to %»tl an-5 mmey tn th# >i./tr. 
and the bu»er for tht conn bra i« n h« rc«n rmntuiud ami** t> pnrrf-av 'he follow '.* <t**<ribed real property, aitaate in 
lb* count) of Weber _ _ _
 t *,»•, if I tan t VM| __ 
*co«tea 
Mora particularly deambed ar '«J1U>*« 
Lot 21, Biock 3t Horefurdnhire Uuhdiviaion No, ?f 'Tiariud it'jidential De?eiop>ent"t 
Roy Ctty. Weber Countj, Utah. 
3 Said Buyer hen*>y ag*et< t« enter lnt« pnvr»«irn and p»> fir Mil de«frib#d pr^ r* «M t**e 1 m of _ 
_.Serenty~one Tboueand and Jlo/lOO - - - - - - - - - -_- _- - - r>0|Urt ,9 J1^3.C£L) 
paya'lt at the office of S»H»r h»« av^  gna or nedcr — _ , 
tfiKtiy »iii»tiith»r«iiominfl timet u»wit *'*&** Thoueand and No/lOO_- -^- -_-_-
 ( l Of000,00_> 
caah, the receipt of »hirh 1* ken by acknowledged, and the balance of f £ J . ' . £ J U A D \ } ahall b« paid at followa 
In •onthly inatallBfnta of $506.92 «orh oonth coaaencirg July 1, 1978 aad continuing 
nonthlj thereafter unti l tba principal and the internet are paid in f u l l . In ad l i t ion 
to thia aonthly f i fure, there will be an additional t5t000 brJloon payutnt due Ko7. 15, 
1979* Tba buyer herein wil l aleo depoeit with Citixena national Bank $55.00 a month 
to ooter taxes and insurance uhlch will be raid to ^ell*rs to reircburae t*** fee ttxea 
iPid insurance rremiums. . . If thia «u» br>roicoe i n e f f i c i e n t , t i e 
aaxmnt will increase according to the aaounle due on tax & insurance. 
The Buyer agrees to pay a %Sk late charge for any payment made l!> djys after due. 
Poaararon of aald premise* «lnU be delivered to buyer on 
4 Said monthl) pa>m»»rit^  arr to hf aiplt"! f«r^ t t« ihr fn>mfnt of intrrnt and i^ eond to the rHurMon of tht 
principal Interest ahall >tr rhai/e) frnm Ha? 15. 1978 . . on all unpaid ptrtitn* >f tht 
purchase pnre at tbr rate nf nine ona-^ i j f t r(M 1 9 ^/k " ) p* r annum Thr Pu>rr at Mf rpt»nn a« arx'jf-r, 
may pj* amount* in f-xn s of lh#» »»»(»Mihl p»)nints up K th^ npa d K§!»nrr "vib,* t #o the l»m»tn»»f rrn *>f a-y m»» jay* 
•T contract hj thi H»'\« r h« i in a* • i» • d « i h r > < « '» In *ri! « t • (»n » In unj 1 J JIM i|il «r in | r^ pa^ . turn « f f »iura 
Hiatollni^nta at the election .f thi innc »hwh tl« t • f. nu>»t br nad« at th* 'in* th. #*/*rsa pajment n ma'e 
I It If und*r*to«> t an ! ajrr« »d tli it tf th»- *s# H« r a rrpt« p»>ri rn* !ruw th« Ih^r on thia runtrart )r\% than ar•« r) t f 
to tba termt herein menUi>n»*if, then hy ao doink*. it *ill tn no wa> alter the termt of the contract aa to the forft Vura 
(aercinafter atipula'cd, or aa to any other remedies of the antler 
• It if underst >od that t*-« re pfsrnMy eu ta an obligation ajra nat «aid property in faror of 
Ojgden Firat Fadaral Savinica and Uan Aaeociation anth an unptad balance of 
tJd,503t6fc . . . .,
 nf Airrll 1 , 1976 . . 
t. Seller repreaenta t'tat th»re are no unpa« 1 np«»cial improvement di«»r *\ t>^e* covering IrrprovtmenU lo a*'d prem-
laea aev tn tht prorata of betnf matalled, or »htch ha«< baeft completed and not paid for, ouUUndmf againt' aaid prop-
etly. a«e#pt th#» following tJOna . . 
I The Seller ia gi\tn the option to atmr*. eremte and munliin loam aecurad by aaid property of not to tireed tht 
then onpaid cor tract balance hereunder, bearing i"'mil at the rate of not to exceed 
_ ^ i n a three quarterfvrf„t 
1^3 Iffy ) p«r annum tnrl pi)ahle in rrgular nunthly in«tal!rnen»«. provided that the aggregate morthly lnaUll«r-#r| 
paymenta {required to be ma le h\ S< Her rn «aid h»an« ahall nut he greattr than each installment payment required to be 
made b> th* Bu>er under thia '••n'rart Minn th. principal due bereunler haa been reduced to the amjunt cf ar/ aach 
loam and laior'gagea the Seller arr»-ri to conve> and the liuyer arret* to aevtpt title to tha abort deaenbed property 
Mb)e«t to aaid loans and mortrage* 
9 If the Bu\er deair^a to e«rrn«e h 1 r»pht thrntifh arorlerated paymrnfi und r^ thu arnren ent to pay off any <lli 
gatltni outatanding at date of thu arrermmt acam^f %a> J property it thail Ke the Buyer a obligation to a* jmt and 
pay any prnalt) which may b* r-qi-rri on pi«pt)n?nt of tad rr'^ r obliyatu>na Prepayment penaltiea in rMr^t 
to abligationi againat aaid probity incurred )<) a^Uer. after dale of thu agreement, ahall be paid by aelVr uni«ia 
aaid obhtatiuna are aasumeu or approved by • >ver 
• " I I P aeaw'^apaaaffTiaamenraiiipaiaiaae » « w « o ^ tTTTjtyyjywgtrnZTTXTTW*Xrrj?*X*S%ljriXTlEtt>t^l l 
XMaci^xxrxjJttga^rixn-i^rKixii^jjc 
U t i u rrii!CTrrmnrri-ixxxi 1 nartLgfiJifxxci.ziitix uurju^ jL.r>nrmr> ntw rrs rvttTXfjonrxiri"i«yarriT-t!f 
aactta^Ti?infcrarilii3u^aaiatigriAa\a>i^g''Jrijii^Aav ii^»rcrAyjr^T^yriLrxtW'ffririltoiKTyrrfc^?ixxxx 
«fPfra,f»vft^.a^rf^ga]Taair.raaa..ir.'i«^ir«A.tt.«^ifa1» flj^TVI 1Ty%%r*TUr*KX.TTIU \'^lTX*JkX 
II The Buyer arret* to pay a'l t a ^ an I » 1 •-!»•»»*«'» rv k n^ and n»» r« *( uh are ot ah "h »rav K* a»«'«a*d 
%t*6 which may btcome dje on th» *c prr«»
 t»,» *)un »» the brr «' •».<• agreement Tre Siller hereby covenant! a»»J agreea 
that thert are MO aat*a«men*t again t PJ I prv»» 1 •*> •«.ep» fK# f ilo*»"jr 
pone 
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I S . T t l f B u j e r f u r t h e r a r r e i » U k « p oil i *«t ir*M< htrit<1t*r< »n<l i T p f ^ m m U or> M J V pr#miv»§ i n « j r r d fa a r«rn 
• • r o M ' t ' t , or I pony a c c o r t r M t t * t b * r— Her In the ar».vunt of n« • V " P v> » K W O P * ' ' baUn-e- _ 
• n i l to aaaip/n aa iJ n « u t i i i f to the S l l i r l » h i * inte»«*t4 m>> rppMif ami to del-vler the in* irar><t p ' ' - -y to hi'n 
n t t a l t a * * » , I M M i ^ f i ' i of l« > i f i f f O 
* n u and inaurar re | ' » * n ' t i m i or • ' t e r 
« t '»maiid. e l ! « J ' K au" - i ao • f»«» > d 
•• at the rate of % of one percent p*r 
14. I l l t h t t * e n t the Buyer i h a l l defaul t in t» #• | * ) n # n » v anv special ct fe| 
p r e m i u m a t o he* * tn provi lr«f the Seller may , • ( I »e »pt «<»•. r » v ••••* ta»ra • • w a r 
• f thorn, and If Seller f l i r l a a» t«« d«», then tl.e M M \ » I n i r r * iu r«p» \ Itu St Met u 
• n d patd by i » m , together »> lh i r t e rea t thereon f r o m l i a e of {a)«»f i<t of eatd au<li 
m e n La » M J 1 pa id . - - - . _ . . _ 
I 1 3 . " B o y r r a t r e # » tha t he » M n ' t com mi* or » , f f » " t * be o»» »»!••#«! a» y « L v « , apotl, or aVatru . t ion t n o r upon 
/ M i d p r o m n e t , | f J that ho anil n . n r U i n eatd p r r t m a r * in food rondtt i«n 
T^-"""'" I I I n the t v f u t of a f a i L r e to f o n - p ' i * » t h the term» r^ r *o f hv the Pu>er , 
""•np" p a ) « » * - t or p a y r r r o l a * b « " »be ei»r«e * h * H * - . " . n * dot «.r * i t h n 
Se l le r , at ti • Op t i tn »h.»II h * \ r tde f. ti mit i f f i l l M u m ^ rerrc l«es 
of t?Mrn f» lyre cf t *e buyer to n a l e 
? Q daya tber»af»»r the 
l» * »i» n | 0 d tya a'»*r » n * t e n r, * e, 
| - » ' > and a'l | >m» t t » h N ht<e 
•h# seller a t ) j «p j j a ted dan.wg • t ti 
r rt»* at h'« optn»»i re e n t / r and 'aka 
t • •»»»* , •»« th - r ¥ i t h all . «•: 
. J »i pr. \»n%* » % «h»M r e m * » - i i h 
• i . •»»i»«it a l »»H »f l'»e Sr »» . » 
f" "t^. m* ! J t t i f r<»*t« in<i . ! t " r ' i > e 
.• >t' i » , i» hx% op'*f>n. f rnm »-•» r t i r jj 
* or 
f* i\"'$»"'«»r a^afl h»v# the n f h t uj^»r: f a t t u ' * »f f»'e f1u»rr l * r « m * d j t^e J * f « J 
| e b< ret^aerd f r o m all «»LI*» .( **n% in IMW • ' • I in * t ' | f y to r» " • > * • ' l|* 
W t n maife t h e t » t o f « r r r.n Una <«««ttr •»* t h) t r l tu>^». »h«H he f »r *• *»» rf 
t K t n»>n f ^ r f o r m a n r r uf th« c o n t r a i t . r»^ • t»-e Uuyer nurt* * »'.*t !*»• **» H.| 
f •» J r . M " I *• • •{•! p* m > . « **j|l». it* )ri/.t\ p | . . r ' ^ » ' as .« * ' if t •••' \ f« l|» 
rt«#nti a«"-' a ' I ' * > rm •• h> »h» H' lvfr tH»». .» * - « • « • . J .• *i 
the lan«l a«.t K» < »f»r the p r « . | . r ' » of th r • M l . i , •«,. J*
 y t r f> . » » .»• i 
T*»e S*M««r rnay hnn»: *m» at i re o\«r ju !»•**• «nt •• r »M •'«!«' | K » « 
!« •« ( t h e u.e nf th.n i» me,h on «ni i r I M M n i i - i c n » , I , ' | n . t | i r -
to t»ne of I S c ! h - i f e m e l«. * f. r e m in in the «v«.-t i f ^ %al- • • I M • •* 
C T h e !UJlrr $h»H h a \ i »h« t«" .1 * • hi t n| i»»t i , :»•»<< w »n »• • ! • •» n . ' • « , t< f' . l ' . \ « r , to i\rr\%tr th» e w r » ' i r^a .d 
b a U n r e b e r e u f t e r at un«e .f»ie an f pa^a^ ' • , a* 1 r-«\ • ' • « ; • r r a ' »t .^ #• J »•• 1 • a« a r> >te ^i i m«»r t» f i . ar , p« , i 
t i t k to tHe B u \ « r m i l . i » * » M t f \ a« J r* " * • U'•»*••. rl »i« U • '*«ir l«i*r lh» M . r in a -^' '> r < U, l f r * i t h thr I I M of 
tbe S l i t e of I ' t a h , a ••» h»* the p». f « t t y «^ . M # * •«» t»'» p* •-!<• » n » ! « J •» t'.^ : • » i m . n l * ' U«- balar •• c * "i». 
inc tu ' l t rg eoa«« a i H - t » . i i » < N *« . * , nt «l *>«» * *. 1 •» n 1 « "\ J » *» • tt «-t f ' »' »• , •• '.c».».<•> » I H h i m , I » I - 1 n 
I n the ia«e r f f . t r t r I M *»H h- I I 1 I M I I U M I H , n| . » '• M»n»» • ( u r .m | lamt haM »>e u r n l iate!) • n i l ' » I to 
the appr nt*n»nt of a • •» » t« tal»« p «• 1 1 «'f .^  i) n«r» i 'ar« .» p n i f y a«. I r - ' l i r t t*i*> r r V i , i<« 1 and 
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NOTICE OF DEFAULT 
AND CANCELLATION OF CONTPACT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that ALMA S. BUTLER and WANDA R. 
BUTLER, are the Sellers named in that certain Uniform Real Estate 
Contract dated May 15, 1978, by and between Alma S. Butler and 
Wanda R. Butler, husband and wife, Sellers, and PAUL S. CORNWELL 
and CATHEP1NE L. CORNWELL, husband and wife, as Buyers on real 
property situated in Weber County, Utah, more particularly d<~>scr:L 
as follows: 
Lot 21, Block 3, HF^FXOPDSIUPE THASF II, "Planned 
Residential Development", Poy City, Weber County, Utah. 
as disclosed by Notice of Contract dated May 15, 1978 and recorced 
May 16, 1978 as Entry #739112 in Book 1242, Page 411, Records of 
Weber County, Utah. 
A breach of the obligations of the Buyers has occurred as 
provided in the Uniform Real Estate Contract in that they have 
failed to pay the sums owed to the Sellers at the times and in 
the amounts as required by said Contract; and the Sellers hereby 
declare said contract, and the interest of Paul S. Cornwell and 
Catherine L.* Cornwell, husband and wife, Buyers, and any other 
persons or lending institutions claiming any interest thereunder 
to be null and void and said contract is hereby cancelled. 
Dated this 4th day of NJarch, 1981 
Alma S. Butler 
Wanda P. Butler 
STATE OF UTAH ( 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF WEBER ( 
On this 4th da\ of Jl.Jich, 1981, trrsonally ri;»pi ared br-»f-/c 
me Alma S. Butler and Wanda R. Butler, husband and wife, signers 
of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. 
, / , 
s / / 
Notary Public 
Residing at O^dcn, Utah 
My concussion expires: 
//.. •• £' 6»r i 
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THIS TRUST DEED is made this 3rd day o! March 
between PAUL S. OORNWELL and CMHERINE L. OCRNWELL, h i s wife 
whoee address is 4461 South 1600 West Roy 
(Street and Number) (City) 
STEWART TITLE COMPANY OF OGDEN 
•19 60 , 
, as Trustor, 
Utah 
(State) 
, aa Trustee,* and 
WILFORD W. GOODWILL and DOROTHY P. GOODWILL, h i s wife as tenants , as Beneficiary, 
in cuinion 
Trustor hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, WITH POWER 
OF SALE, the following described property situated in Weber County, Utah: 
lot 21, Block 3, HEREFORDSHIRE II, a plarmdd residential development, 
according to the official plat thereof. 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of way, 
easements, rents, issues, profits income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING payment bf the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory 
38,000.00 , payable to the order of note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $ 
Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth,'and payment of any 
•urns expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the security hereof. 
Trustor agrees to pay all taxes and assessments on the above property, to pay all charges and 
assessments on water or water stock used on or with said property, not to commit waste, to maintain 
adequate fire insurance on improvements on said property, to pay all costs and expenses of collec-
tion (including Trustee's and attorney's fees in event of default in payment of the indebtedness se-
cured hereby and to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services performed by Trustee 
hereunder, including a reconveyance hereof 
The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF ***** I 
On the 3th day of March • 19 80 personally appeared before me 
Paul S* OarnweH and Catherine L. Oornwell, h i s wife 7 the signer. s 
of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge^ to me that .t/he y executed the same. 
My Commission Expires: 10/4/81 
•NOTE: Tnatfoo ama* b* a Member of the Utah 
too*t association authorised to do each 
Utah; or a title ' 
van a bank, buttdint aiid fflfcnanwrination or eavins» and 
1 ia Utah; a corporation authoriatd to do a trust hutiora* 1 
ay eathorisod to do audi basinoai in Utah. 
flZWARTITTLE COMPANY OF OGDEN 707 24th Street • Ogden, Utah 84401 
A-S 
W-1642 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered 
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
i 38 .000 .00 OGDEN, UTAH 
APRTT, 3 19_BflL. 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
WIUP0RD W. GOODWILL and DOROTHY P. GOODWILL, h i s wife a s t enan t s in caimon 
MtPTY B<3*r THOUSAND AND NQ/IOO-
— • H O L L A R S ($ j8 i jD00 s00_)> 
together with interest from date at the rate of TOELvT, per centQ-2 %) per annum on 
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
Payments of $944,67 per month beginning May 1, 1980 and $944.67 on or before t he 
f i r s t day of each and every month t he r ea f t e r u n t i l the e n t i r e p r i n c i p a l and 
i n t e r e s t a r e paid i n f u l l . 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal Any 
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of FiruagJ per 
cent ( 15 %) per annum until paid. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with 
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection in-
cluding a reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
rfZJ J L £ ^ / l . . . if 
STEWART TTTLE COMPANY OF OGDEN 
3644 Lincoln Avenue * Suite 1 • Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801)621-8010 
CERTIFICATE OF MMLHH3 
I hereby certify that on this 3/iA^ day of ^jj/lUl^l^^
 9 
198JTT I nailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, 
by placing same in the United States nail,i postage prepaid and 
addressed to the following: 
FRANK S. WARNER 
D0U3IAS J. HDI/4ES 
543 Twenty-Fifth Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
